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ABSTRACT
As machine learning models are increasingly used for high-stakes
decision making, scholars have sought to intervene to ensure that
such models do not encode undesirable social and political values.
However, little attention thus far has been given to how values in-
fluence the machine learning discipline as a whole. How do values
influence what the discipline focuses on and the way it develops?
If undesirable values are at play at the level of the discipline, then
intervening on particular models will not suffice to address the prob-
lem. Instead, interventions at the disciplinary-level are required.
This paper analyzes the discipline of machine learning through
the lens of philosophy of science. We develop a conceptual frame-
work to evaluate the process through which types of machine
learning models (e.g. neural networks, support vector machines,
graphical models) become predominant. The rise and fall of model-
types is often framed as objective progress. However, such disci-
plinary shifts are more nuanced. First, we argue that the rise of a
model-type is self-reinforcing–it influences the way model-types
are evaluated. For example, the rise of deep learning was entangled
with a greater focus on evaluations in compute-rich and data-rich
environments. Second, the way model-types are evaluated encodes
loaded social and political values. For example, a greater focus on
evaluations in compute-rich and data-rich environments encodes
values about centralization of power, privacy, and environmental
concerns.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Given the increased use of machine learning models for high-stakes
decision making, a growing body of work aims to understand and
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intervene in the social values embedded within machine learning
models. For example, to understand whether such models exacer-
bate existing racial, gender, or other disparities between groups
and to intervene to mitigate such disparities [1–6].
We ask a complementary question: how are societal, political,
environmental, and other values embedded within the machine
learning discipline? In particular, how do values influence what
the discipline focuses on and the way it develops? It is important
to think about these questions because when undesirable values
are at play at the level of the discipline, intervening on particular
models will not suffice to address the problem. Rather, the correct
intervention must also be posed at the level of the discipline.
The focus of this paper is how values shape the development of
the discipline over time. We argue that major disciplinary shifts
within the machine learning discipline are not (and cannot be)
“objective” processes — instead, they are value-laden. This is a con-
sequential distinction. Certain values are still implicit even when
disciplinary shifts are incorrectly seen as objective progress. How-
ever, because they are hidden they are simply accepted as a default.
In order to make any intentional choices about values, we must
first recognize that they exist and are at work.
Our argument proceeds in three parts.
Section 2: First, we give a conceptual, descriptive framework for
progress in machine learning. We argue that “model-types" within
machine learning, e.g. deep learning, graphical models, support
vector machines, guide and organize research activities in machine
learning. We point out similarities and differences between model
types and traditional concepts from philosophy of science - Kuhn’s
paradigms and Lakatos’s research programmes.
Section 3: Second, we argue that the rise of a model-type is self-
reinforcing: it comes hand in hand with the rise of corresponding
criteria for evaluating model-types. We use the recent rise of deep
learning as a case study to illustrate this point. We visit a commonly-
cited cause for the rise of deep learning: its success in the 2012
ImageNet challenge. However, we argue that ImageNet not only
triggered a shift to deep learning, but also a shift to evaluating
models in the environments that deep learning performs best in,
namely, compute-rich and data-rich environments.
Section 4: Third, we argue that criteria used to evaluate model-
types encode loaded social and political values. We again illus-
trate the point using deep learning as a case study. Deep learning
performs better when evaluated in compute-rich and data-rich
environments, and typically better when evaluated on predictive
accuracy (as compared to other evaluations around robustness or
interpretability). This kind of evaluation furthers certain values,
such as centralization of power, while hindering other values, such
as environmental sustainability and privacy. Therefore, the rise of
deep learning is not straightforwardly “objective" but, rather, is a
value-laden process.
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Our contributions. We have written our paper to be of interest
to both philosophers of science and machine learning researchers,
and our contributions are slightly different for each group. For both
groups, we give a more nuanced account of disciplinary shifts in
machine learning, and highlight ways in which values shape the
discipline. For machine learning researchers, we hope the explicit
exposition helps to bring into awareness and shift some of the
values present in the discipline. In addition, for philosophers of
science, our descriptive account of machine learning is a conceptual
contribution on its own. First, since to our knowledge this is the first
work analyzing machine learning as a discipline from a philosophy
of science perspective1, we hope that our framework provides a
starting point for others to further analyze the growing discipline of
machine learning. Second, considering the case of machine learning
can be helpful in reexamining traditional concepts in philosophy of
science. In particular, our analysis suggests that it may be possible
to reproduced traditional concepts and puzzles from the philosophy
of science without the normal focus on theories and hypotheses.
2 MODEL TYPES AS ORGANIZING AND
GUIDING RESEARCH
Machine learning models can be grouped into different types based
on the ways that they extract patterns from data. Deep learning
models (neural networks), graphical models, decision trees, and
support vector machines, are all examples of model types. We argue
that model types are more than just a technical apparatus. Model
types guide the research agenda of machine learning practitioners
who are committed to them, and when many people are committed
to the same model type the discipline and the resources available
to practitioners change.
We start this section by explaining what it means to be com-
mitted to a model type. We then explain how this commitment
influences research agendas and the discipline. Last, we point out
analogies and differences between the function of model types in
machine learning and paradigms and research programmes in nat-
ural sciences. These will later be used to argue that comparison
between model types is not an objective process.
2.1 Commitment to model-types
Researchers often associate their work with a specific model-type.
For example, they sometimes identify themselves as working on
specifically “deep learning" or “graphical models". This reflects the
fact that researchers can be committed to a model-type – have a
favored model-type and focus on improving that model-type as a
means to making research progress. Commitments to model-types
also manifest in structuring machine learning workshops. Since in
machine learning, workshops are meant to provide smaller venues
to focus on making progress, this indicates that centering on a
model-type can be seen as a way of making progress. For example,
this year’s International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)
included at least seven workshops focused specifically on deep
learning2.
1Related work in philosophy of science includes work on how philosophy of science
and machine learning can illuminate one another on topics like inductivism, the logic
of discovery, and scientific realism. For examples, see [7–16]
2The deep learning workshops at 2019 ICML were: “Theoretical Physics for Deep
Learning"; “Uncertainty and Robustness in Deep Learning"; “Synthetic Realities: Deep
Researchers who are committed to a certain model-type think of
that model-type as generalizable - that the success that the model-
type had on some problems is an indication that, if we put more
work into it, it will do well on many other problems. A commitment
to a model-type is therefore fueled by some exemplars, some cases
of great success for the model-type which are taken to be strong
evidence for generalizability. For example, deep learning’s success
on a particular computer vision challenge, called ImageNet, was
taken as evidence for its potential future success on other types of
problems (we discuss ImageNet in greater detail in Section 3).
A commitment to a model-type has downstream effects for the
research that is done. Model-types guide the research agenda of
machine learning practitioners who are committed to them, and
when many people are committed to the same model-type the
discipline and the resources available to practitioners change. In
particular, we argue that a commitment to model-types guides the
selection of problems, constrains the creation of solutions, and
promotes prerequisites around supporting tools and technologies.
2.2 How a commitment to a model-type
influences research
2.2.1 Problem selection. Those who are committed to a model-type
work to increase its precision and expand its scope.
Different model-types are naturally good at different things.
Those who are committed to a model-type work to improve its per-
formance in those areas in which it is doing less well. For example,
deep learning models have done very well in the field of computer
vision and, more recently, in other fields such as natural language
processing and reinforcement learning. However, deep learning
has done less well in areas such as those involving causal, logical,
or probabilistic reasoning. Other model-types, such as functional
causal models, decision rules, or probabilistic graphical models
(PGMs), are often better at these problems. But researchers are now
working to improve the ability of deep learning models to represent
causal [17], logical [18], or probabilistic knowledge [19, 20].
In this way, commitments to model-types skew the selection
of problems by virtue of the model-type’s varying strengths and
weakness.
2.2.2 Constraining the search for solutions. Model-types also help
constrain the solutions considered to problems. When a research
is committed to a model-type, she believes working on the model-
type will be the most fruitful path to progress. Thus, she primarily
pursues improvements to her committed model-type, rather than
pursuing improvements to other model-types or devising a new
model-type all-together.
Improvements to a model-type are often made by revising hy-
perparameters, which are the parameters which must be specified
by the researcher rather than learned from the data. In deep learn-
ing, hyperparameters include specification of the mathematical
transformations between layers, how many units are in each layer,
how many layers there are, and so on. For example, an important
hyperparameter innovation in deep learning was the change from
Learning for Detecting AudioVisual Fakes"; “Understanding and Improving Generaliza-
tion in Deep Learning"; “Identifying and Understanding Deep Learning Phenomena";
“On-Device Machine Learning & Compact Deep Neural Network Representations";
and “Invertible Neural Networks and Normalizing Flows"
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Figure 1: A toy rendition of two different ways that model
performance can improve with data. Model A performs bet-
ter than Model B in a low-data regimen, but Model B per-
forms better in a high-data regime.
using a sigmoidal or tanh function for the non-linear transforma-
tion between layers to using a ReLU function, a change that is often
considered to have been essential to the revival of deep learning
[21].
2.2.3 Prerequisites. The success of a model-type depends on as-
sociated prerequisites around supporting tools, technologies, and
information. A commitment to a model-type shapes the discipline
by promoting and reinforcing such prerequisites. Consider deep
learning as an example.
One prerequisite for the success of a deep learning is the amount
of data available. Machine learning algorithms are data-driven, and
are supposed to get better at a given task the more data they are
provided. However, there are different ways in which a model’s
performance may improve with more data. Figure 1 depicts two
such ways – one model (curve A) has better performance with
smaller amounts of data and the other model (curve B) has better
performance with larger amounts of data. For any model, its “data
efficiency”, its performance as a function of the amount of data,
will vary depending on the application. But generally, different
model-types tend to achieve success with different levels of data.
Deep learning typically requires large data sets to perform well
[22, 23]. Other methods, support vector machines, linear models,
probabilistic graphical models, etc., can often do better on smaller
data sets. Thus, deep learning requires a larger data prerequisite
than other model types.
Another prerequisite for deep learning is extensive compute
power, the amount of computations that a computer can process
within a given time frame. All model-types benefit from running on
computers that have a lot of compute power, but some model-types
benefit more than others. A similar graph to Figure 1 can also hold
with compute power on the x-axis. Similar to the data case, deep
learning would follow the pattern of curve B. Unlike other model
types, it performs better given access to large amounts of compute
power. Thus, the availability of a lot of compute power may be a
prerequisite for deep learning, but not for other model-types.
Third, model-types require specialized technologies. For exam-
ple, deep learning requires graphics processing units (GPUs), a
specialized type of hardware. GPUs are useful for deep learning
because they speed up the process of performing matrix multiplica-
tions, a computation that is essential to deep learning models but
not necessarily for other model-types. Model-types can also benefit
from specialized software that makes it easier for researchers to
create models of that type. For example, deep learning benefited
from the creation of software packages that automatically perform
backpropagation, an algorithm used to compute derivatives that is
primarily used to train deep learning models. Other model-types
can also benefit from such software packages, but much less.
A commitment to a model-type involves promoting the prereq-
uisites that model-type needs, for example building the right tools,
collecting enough data, or buying the amount of compute resources
necessary. When many people are committed to the same model-
type, the resources available to the discipline at large change, rein-
forcing the predominance of that model-type. For example, as the
popularity of deep learning increased, industry labs like Facebook
and Google have put effort into developing easy-to-use supporting
software, such as PyTorch [24] and Tensorflow [25], which have
greatly reduced the barrier to entry for creating deep learning mod-
els. Furthermore, many industry labs have also designed hardware
to accelerate deep learning by creating components that are spe-
cialized for the computations used by deep learning models [26].
For example, Nvidia frames one of their recent GPUs as “Tesla P100:
The Fastest Accelerator for Training Deep Neural Networks” [27].
The mass commitment to deep learning has promoted the avail-
ability of data, compute power, and the specialized technologies
required for deep learning.
2.3 Similarities and differences between
model-types and traditional concepts
The functionality of model-types in machine learning is similar to
the functionality of Kuhnian paradigms and Lakatosian research
programmes in science. However, it is also different in important
ways.
We argued that researchers who are committed to a model-type
work to increase the scope and precision of that model-type. This
functionality is analogous to the way paradigms3 function in the
natural sciences according to Kuhn (1962). Kuhn argues that most
of the time scientists are concerned with increasing the scope and
precision of their paradigm. Theoretical and experimental scientists
are engaged in activities such as applying analogous solutions
to more and more problems, getting better agreement between
observation and theory, elaborating the theory to make it easier to
compare it to observations, and so on (e.g. Kuhn, 1962, pp. 25-230).
We have also argued that researchers who are committed to a
model-type look for ways to overcome problems by making adjust-
ments within the confines of that model-type. They may tune the
hyperparameters (which are the aspects of the model that must be
specified by the researcher). Or when it doesn’t work, they may
blame the prerequisites, e.g., in the case of deep learning, argue that
there isn’t sufficient compute power or data. This functionality is
analogous to the way scientists work with research programmes ac-
cording to Lakatos (1970). Lakatos argues that scientific theories are
3In the narrowest sense, a Kuhnian paradigm is an exemplar - a widely accepted
solution to a problem. See Hoyningen-Huene (1993) for more discussion of the different
senses of "paradigm"
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Figure 2: A figure (reproduced from OpenAI [28]) depicting the change in amount of computational power used to train key
results in machine learning. The amount of compute power is measured on the y-axis in petaflop/s-days, which translates
to the number of operations (e.g. add, multiply) performed during model training divided by roughly 1020. Before 2012, the
amount of compute power follows Moore’s law and doubles at a 2-year rate. However, after 2012, the amount of compute
power used increases much more rapidly – doubling every 3.4 months. As we can see, 2012, the year that marked the rise of
deep learning, also marked a drastic shift in the reliance on compute power.
composed of core hypotheses, which are the hypotheses scientists
mainly defend, and auxiliary hypotheses, which connect between
the core hypotheses and observations. For example, in the Newto-
nian research programme, the core hypotheses are the three laws of
motion. The auxiliary hypotheses include definitions of the terms
the laws use (such as mass), procedures for measuring the quanti-
ties the laws are about (such as mass and velocity), methodologies
on the correct use of scales, what reasonable margins of errors are,
and so on. Upon conflicts with experience, scientists tend to revise
the auxiliary hypotheses to save the core from falsification. When
a prediction fails one can always blame the instruments, initial
conditions, and so on. As a result of modifying the core hypotheses,
a series of theories is created - that is the research programme.
However, model-types differ from paradigms and research pro-
grammes in that they seem to rely much less on activities of theory-
making. Model-types themselves are not theories, and are not com-
posed of hypotheses like research programmes (at least not straight-
forwardly).4 Researchers may have hypotheses about which model-
types will be the most successful, but the model-type itself does not
seems to consist of theories or hypotheses in the same way that a
paradigm or research programme does.
The differences between the activities in machine learning and
other disciplines invite not only naming new concepts (which is
what we have done with “model-type"), but also re-examination of
these traditional philosophy of science concepts. For example: To
what extent would it be useful to apply traditional concepts from
philosophy of science, such as “theory", “paradigm", or “research
programme", to machine learning? How central are activities of
theory-making to the these traditional concepts, given that it seems
possible to reproduce their functionality without it? Thinking about
4Some may wonder whether deep learning can be a theory – a theory of how the
brain works. Indeed, the earliest neural network (connectionist) models were inspired
by neuroscience. However, to most modern machine learning researchers, who are
more interested in the performance gains produced by deep learning, this is only a
tangential connection. And as neuroscience has progressed, it has become clear that
the neural networks used in machine learning are far simpler than the neural networks
in the brain [32, 33].
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such questions is among the ways in which machine learning can
enrich philosophy of science.
3 COMPARISON BETWEEN MODEL TYPES IS
MODEL-TYPE-LADEN
How can model-types be compared? Some natural ways include
comparing the problems that the model-type is successful at solving
and the reasonableness of the background assumptions the model-
typess rely on. However, as we have argued, a commitment to a
model-type involves taking a stand on these very issues. Thus,
being committed to a certain model-type means not being neutral
with respect to the measures of success of model-types. We can’t
exactly say that a person committed to model-type Awould become
committed to model-type B if it is shown that model B solves the
important problems better. Rather, changing your commitment may
involve changing your views on which problems are important and
what it means for a solution to be “better".
In this section, we illustrate this complexity using the rise of
deep learning. We start by examining a common explanation for
the rise of deep learning—the success of a deep learning model in
the ImageNet competition.
3.1 ImageNet
ImageNet is a large-scale database of over 14 million images that
was curated for the goal of furthering computer vision and re-
lated research [34]. Between 2010-2017, ImageNet ran an annual
competition called the “ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge", which is also commonly referred to as simply “Ima-
geNet" [35]. The task for the competition was to classify images
into one of 1000 known classes. No deep learning models were sub-
mitted in the years 2010 and 2011, and the best error rate was 25.8%
[36, 37]. In 2012, the winner was the single deep learning model
which was submitted, AlexNet [21]. AlexNet achieved a 16.4% error
rate, a remarkable 10% percent lower than the runner-up.
This success is commonly cited as a trigger for the rise of deep
learning. For example, Yann Lecun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey
Hinton, who received the Turing Award in 2019 for their work
in deep learning, said that [38]: “ConvNets [a type of neural net-
work] were largely forsaken by the mainstream computer vision and
machine-learning communities until the ImageNet competition in
2012.”
By 2014, nearly all the submissions to the ImageNet challenge
were deep learning models and the error rate steadily decreased.
Deep learning became increasingly popular not only within the
competition, but also outside of it — in the industry at large as well
as in academia.
3.2 Does ImageNet justify the rise of deep
learning?
In the natural sciences, success in a given experiment cannot justify
a shift to a different paradigm or research programme on its own.
It requires, among other things, prioritizing standards and prefer-
ences. To borrow Lakatos’s example (1970), consider comparing
Newton’s early theory of optics, which focused on light-refraction,
and Huyghens’s early theory of light, which focused on light in-
terference. We could compare between the two using experiments
pertaining to, for example light-refraction. If we considered these
experiments as crucial, then we would adopt Newton’s theory over
Huyghen’s theory. But in doing so, we would also implicitly be
elevating the problem of light-refraction over the problem of light
interference. When prioritizing problems researchers are not nec-
essarily under the illusion that, at the moment the prioritization
is made, one theory is superior to all others in all respects. Rather,
there is great hope and anticipation that the chosen theory’s suc-
cess on the puzzle of interest indicates success on other puzzles as
well. The question is then: why do some experiments trigger this
hope while others do not?
Similarly, in explaining the popularity of a model-type it is not
enough to point out success in some competition. The question is
not in which competitions a model-type did well, but rather why
the success in some competitions rather than others had impact on
the discipline. Deep learning did well in other competitions prior
to ImageNet, but these didn’t make nearly the same impact on the
discipline as its success in ImageNet. For example, Jürgen Schmid-
huber’s team at the Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence
Research, won four computer vision competitions with deep learn-
ing models [39, 39, 40] between May 15, 2011 and September 20,
2012 [41]. The 2012 ImageNet competition was September 30, 2012.
Matthew Zeiler, one of the winners of the 2013 ImageNet challenge,
also notes that [42]: “This Imagenet 2012 event was definitely what
triggered the big explosion of AI today. There were definitely some
very promising results in speech recognition shortly before this... but
they didn’t take off publicly as much as that ImageNet win did in
2012 and the following years." Furthermore, while deep learning
models did very well on ImageNet and other computer vision and
speech recognition competitions, they did less well in other areas,
such as causal, probabilistic, or logical reasoning, again calling into
question why ImageNet had such a large impact.
ImageNet, but not prior competitions, sparked great hope that
deep learning could generalize in the field of computer vision and
beyond. For example, Ilya Sutskever, one of the winners of the 2012
Imagenet challenge, said, “It was so clear that if you do a really good
on ImageNet, you could solve image recognition” [42]. Indeed, in a
paper at CVPR 2019 (a computer vision conference) [43] claim, "An
implicit hypothesis in modern computer vision research is that models
that perform better on ImageNet necessarily perform better on other
vision tasks. However, this hypothesis has never been systematically
tested." Furthermore, the influence of ImageNet spread outside of
the field of computer visions, and triggered hopes of generalization
in other fields as well.
So what, if anything, makes ImageNet special? One important
factor was that ImageNet’s database was much larger. Compare
ImageNet to its main predecessor, the PASCAL VOC challenge
[44, 45]. PASCAL VOC was a better established image classification
challenge, and in the first two years that the ImageNet challenge
was hosted, it was co-located with PASCAL VOC challenge as a
mere “taster" competition. However, PASCAL VOC 2010 had only
20 classes and 19,737 images, while the ImageNet 2010 had 1000
classes and 1,461,406 images.
When the paper detailing the ImageNet database was originally
published in 2009, skeptics disputed the value of such a large-scale
database. Jia Deng, the lead author of the paper, said [42] “There
were comments like ’If you can’t even do one object well, why would
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you do thousands, or tens of thousands of objects?’". And yet, after
ImageNet, many people take for granted the importance of large
datasets.
Thus, the 2012 ImageNet challenge did not simply showcase the
high performance of deep learning, it also marked a shift in how
researchers thought progress would bemade.More andmore people
began to believe that the field could make significant progress
simply by scaling up datasets [23].
Furthermore, 2012 ImageNet also impacted the way people con-
ceived of the role of compute power in progress. This is reflected
in the increase in the amount of compute power used to train mod-
els after 2012. Researchers from OpenAI found that before 2012,
the amount of compute power used to train neural networks was
doubling at a 2-year rate in correspondence to Moore’s law. Since
2012, when the current deep learning boom began, the amount of
compute power used to train deep learning models that achieve
state-of-the-art results has been increasing exponentially, doubling
every 3.5 months [28]. Both trends are shown in Figure 2 (repro-
duced with permission from OpenAI).
Thus, the rise of deep learning came hand in hand with the
rise of a new way to assess the success of models – in data-rich
and compute-rich environments. Indeed, the shift is advocated for
by the authors of the winning 2012 ImageNet model [21]: "All of
our experiments suggest that our results can be improved simply by
waiting for faster GPUs and bigger datasets to become available."
It would be natural to assume that these shifts in the conception
of progress were the result of new tools or resources that were not
present before. For example, the increase in compute power was
possible through the use of GPUs and techniques like GPU paral-
lelization. However, the mere availability of these tools does not
by itself imply that we ought to evaluate progress in environments
that are rich in data and compute power. Doing so assumes that
we should define “progress” based on metrics that do not depend
on the amount of data or compute power used, e.g. classification
accuracy. However, we may have good reason to reject a data and
compute-independent notion of progress. For example, we may
reject to increased data collection for privacy reasons or the use of
increased computational power for environmental costs. We will
discuss this point in more detail in Section 4.
In conclusion, we cannot straightforwardly say that ImageNet
shows that deep learning is better than other model-types. This
explanation takes for granted prerequisites of deep learning - that
model-types should be evaluated in data-rich and compute-rich en-
vironments. If models are evaluated under the conditions in which
deep learning models performs better, then the cards are stacked in
favor of deep learning. The more general point here is that evalu-
ation of model-types depends on considerations on which people
committed to different model-types would disagree. Therefore, eval-
uation of model-types is model-type-laden: it depends on which
model-type the evaluator is committed to.
3.3 Incommensurability?
The claim that comparison between model-types is model-type-
laden is analogous to the claim that comparison between paradigms
is paradigm-laden, i.e. that paradigms are incommensurable. Since
incommesurability has been harshly criticized, one might wonder
how plausible it is to claim that comparison between model-types is
model-typle-laden. However, key criticisms to incommensurability
are not applicable in the case of machine learning.
What is incommensurability? In The Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions5 , Kuhn highlighted three interconnected aspects of in-
commensurability: semantic, ontological/perceptual, and method-
ological.6 From the semantic perspective, we can’t say that the
laws of one paradigm are derivable from the laws of a different
paradigms due to the semantic differences between them. In other
words, paradigms are not straightforwardly comparable because
key terms don’t mean or refer to the same things. For example, it
is not the case that Newton’s laws are derivable from Einsteinian
mechanics because key terms, such as mass, don’t mean the same
thing. Second, we can’t say that one paradigm describes the world
better than another because the world itself is different for peo-
ple working within different paradigms. The reason is that Kuhn
argues that observations crucially depend on the theory held by
those who take them, that is - that observation is theory-laden.
Since the conceptual apparatus of different paradigms is different,
the observations made by practitioners of different paradigms are
different. So different that practitioners of different paradigms es-
sentially practice science in different worlds. Third, we can’t say
that one paradigm is better than another because it does a better
job at solving important problem. The reason is that, since the
worlds of practitioners of different paradigms are different, the list
of problems of interest are different. In addition, the standards of
success are different.
The semantic aspect of Kuhn’s incommensurability received
most of the critical attention, at least in philosophy of science
[49–51].7 However, the incommensurability-like effect in machine
learning doesn’t directly depend on semantics. Model-types are
incommensurable because people who are committed to different
model-types would disagree on the measures to use to compare
them. For example, among other things, the dominance of deep
learning involves shifting to favoring evaluations in data-rich and
compute-rich environments. There is no need to appeal to the use
of specialized languages or the theory-ladenness of observations to
see this methodological incommensurability in machine learning.
Moreover, semantic and ontological/perceptual incommensurabil-
ity are less convincing than they are in the case of natural sciences.
As researchers are not directly invested in theorizing about what
the world is like, there is no need to think of the work of researchers
working in different model-types as resulting in commitments to
specialized language about what the world is like and shape obser-
vations. In other words, there is no need to think of researchers
committed to different model-types as working in different worlds
5Kuhn dedicated much of his work after The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to
developing the concept of incommensurability. While some think that his concept of
incommensurability has changed greatly in subsequent work (e.g. [46]), others thinks
the later work is a refinement of the earlier work (e.g. [29])
6We follow the distinction made by Bird (2018). See [29, 46, 48] for different versions
of this distinction.
7The focus on the semantic aspect is perhaps due to the fact that Kuhn’s later work
(e.g. Kuhn, 1982) as well as Feyerabend’s (1978) version of incommensurabily focus on
semantic incommensurability. Other criticisms of incommensurability focus on the
implications of incommensurability. See, e.g. Lauden (1996) and Gattei (2003).
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or unable to fully communicate about the world. Thus, methodolog-
ical incommensurability in machine learning is independent from
semantic and ontological/perceptual incommensurability.
4 COMPARISON BETWEEN MODEL TYPES IS
VALUE-LADEN
Having conceptualized how progress takes place in machine learn-
ing, we can now see how values shape the discipline at large. We
have argued that prioritization of model-types is model-type-laden,
in the sense that it depends on considerations on which people
committed to different model-types would disagree. We now argue
those same considerations are also value-laden in the sense that
they implicitly encode political, social, and other values. Therefore,
prioritization of model-types is not only model-type-laden but also
value-laden. We illustrate on the case of deep learning.
4.1 Prerequisites
Prioritization of model-types requires favoring one set of prereq-
uisites over another. When the prerequisites encode social and
political values, the prioritization is value-laden. Let’s consider two
of the prerequisites for deep learning as examples.
4.1.1 Compute Power. We have pointed out that, unlike other
model-types, deep learning requires using a lot of compute power
and a lot of GPUs in particular. This prerequisite is a carrier of a
political value - centralization of power. Centralization of power,
or rather decentralization of power, is already explicitly used for
comparison between procedures and techniques in science and
medicine. The general point is that tools that can only be made
or used by a selected few, because they are complex or expansive,
contribute to the concentration power. Such tools are only available
to those with means, and they sustain and deepen the dependency
between those who are in a position to provide the services and
those who need those services [56]. For example, in agriculture,
sophisticated technologies create dependency on those who have
the means and expertise to use them. Techniques that are accessible
and can be locally implemented, such as small scale sustainable
agriculture, promote decentralization of power. People who advo-
cate for techniques of this sort are making the power dynamics
involved in utilizing certain tools and procedures explicit and favor
those which decentralize power.
Kevin Elliott (2017) highlights these issues with regards to the vi-
tamin A deficiency crisis. Vitamin A deficiency is an acute problem
among the poor worldwide, to the extent that hundreds of thou-
sands of people become blind or die of it every year. One proposed
course of action is to utilize a genetically modified species of rice,
called "golden rice", which is enriched with vitamin A. Another
alternative is to look into which of the crops that are indigenous to
the relevant areas are rich in vitamin A, and encourage locals to
consume them. Elliott argues that addressing the vitamin A prob-
lem using golden rice caters the western biochemical community,
which not only stands to benefit from selling golden rice but also
related tools of western agriculture that would likely accompany it
such as pesticides and fertilizers (2017, p. 42).
The compute power prerequisite promotes centralization of
power in two related ways. First, since GPUs are very expansive
they create an entry barrier that favors those with financial means,
such as big companies in rich countries. In addition, GPUs sus-
tain and deepen the dependency on the major corporations that
produce or can afford them. Hopefully, the cost of GPUs will drop
substantially over time. However, like golden rice, the compute
power prerequisite promotes centralization of power even if it is
cheap. Even if golden rice is cheap, it creates a need to rely on
products that would not be necessary using other techniques.
The contribution of the popularization of deep learning to cen-
tralization of power has also been noticed by other researchers.
For example, Strubell et al. (2019) note that: “Limiting this style of
research to industry labs hurts the NLP [natural language process-
ing] research community in many ways. First, it stifles creativity.
Researchers with good ideas but without access to large-scale compute
will simply not be able to execute their ideas, instead constrained
to focus on different problems. Second, it prohibits certain types of
research on the basis of access to financial resources. This even more
deeply promotes the already problematic “rich get richer" cycle of
research funding, where groups that are already successful and thus
well-funded tend to receive more funding due to their existing accom-
plishments. Third, the prohibitive start-up cost of building in-house
resources forces resource-poor groups to rely on cloud compute services
such as AWS, Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure."
The compute power prerequisite also encodes environmental
values. Using environmental values to compare between tools and
procedures in science and agriculture is not new. For example, one
of the reasons Greenpeace objects to using golden rice is due to en-
vironmental concerns (Elliott, 2017, p 43). In machine learning, the
extensive computational resources required by deep learning mod-
els take a toll on the environment. For example, Strubell et al. (2019)
found that training one especially large state-of-the-art deep learn-
ing model resulted in carbon emissions that were over three times
the amount of the carbon emissions in one car’s average lifetime .
These large environmental impacts have also been noticed by the
Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which recently released a
position paper stating that “Green AI" would be an emerging focus
at the institute [60].
4.1.2 Data. Another prerequisite for deep learning is the availabil-
ity of large data sets for training. Large data sets introduce several
complexities. First, they create entry barriers because not everyone
has access to sufficiently large amounts of data. This gives an ad-
vantage to large companies and promotes centralization of power,
like the compute power prerequisite.
Second, the collection of data about people, e.g. their location,
heartbeat rates, or clicks, introduces an additional set of complex-
ities around privacy, which bear on individual freedoms. For ex-
ample, a 2009 House of Lords report on surveillance (2009) stated
that “Mass surveillance has the potential to erode privacy. As privacy
is an essential pre-requisite to the exercise of individual freedom, its
erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on which democracy
and good governance have traditionally been based in this country."
Deep learning requires mass collection of data and when this data
is sensitive data about individuals, then it comes in tension with
the value individual freedom which is associated with privacy.
Furthermore, it is a fact that we havemore of certain kinds of data
about some groups rather than others, and this data can be abused.
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For example, an anonymous programmer created a deep learning-
based app called “DeepNude", which allowed users to upload a
photo of any woman and receive a fake, undressed version of the
photo. The creator stated that the app only worked for women
because, due to pornography, it is easier to find images of nude
women online [62]. Technology that requires large amounts of data
to work furthers the power structures underlying what kinds of
data are available about certain groups in the first place.
4.2 Evaluation Criteria
In comparing between theories, one needs to rely on characteris-
tics of the theories as a whole - e.g. are they internally consistent?
Are they consistent with established theories? Do they entail accu-
rate predictions? Do they serve humanity well? Do they promote
equal opportunity? Such characteristics of theories are often called
“theoretical virtues". Evaluating theories based on their theoretical
virtues is a value-laden activity when theoretical virtues are carriers
of values.
Some of these virtues, such as applicability to human needs, wear
their value commitments on their sleeves. However, even virtues
that appear neutral, such as simplicity and consistency, are at least
sometimes carriers of political, social, or other values (this was
pointed out by, e.g., Kuhn (1977), and Longino (1996). To borrow
two examples from Longino, consider consistency with established
theories. If the established theories are sexist, new theories will also
need to be sexist to be consistent with them. Similarly, simplicity
favors theories with fewer kinds of entities. Therefore, theories in
biology which treat all humans as versions of a man are simpler
than theories which have multiple archetypes of humans. However,
these simpler theories are androcentric. Moreover, even if virtues
like simplicity and consistency are not themselves politically or
socially loaded, comparing between them and virtues that are is
loaded. Suppose theory A is simpler and more consistent with
established theories (for whatever reason) and theory B is more
applicable to human needs. Even if simplicity and consistency are
not politically loaded, favoring theory A over theory B involves
taking a stand on what it more important and that is loaded.
Similar points apply to evaluation criteria in machine learning.
Well known evaluation criteria for models include accuracy, ex-
plainability, transparency, and fairness. Some of these criteria, like
fairness, are explicitly politically loaded. But even criteria that ap-
pear neutral on first glance may be carriers of values because of
what it takes to satisfy them. Accuracy is one example. Which
considerations is it permissible to use when attempting to make ac-
curate predictions? For example, when is it permissible to use racial
identity in making predictions about recidivism? Today, many think
that we should not use social identity attributes, such as race and
gender, to make such predictions even if they increase accuracy.8
The disapproval of using protected identities in making predic-
tions is reflected in regulation. In the US, laws such as the Fair
Housing Act (FHA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), are being implemented on
predictions based on big data and prohibit the use of protected
8We note as a separate point that many in the machine learning and ethics commu-
nity have pointed out that “fairness through unawareness" is an insufficient solution
because machine learning classifiers can still pick up on proxies for the sensitive
attributes (Dwork et al., 2012; Hardt et al., 2016).
identities for making decisions on loans, employment, and so on.
For example, a 2016 report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
determines that: “an employer may not disfavor a particular pro-
tected group because big data analytics show that members of this
protected group are more likely to quit their jobs within a five-year
period. Similarly, a lender cannot refuse to lend to single persons
or offer less favorable terms to them than married persons even if
big data analytics show that single persons are less likely to repay
loans than married persons." (2016, p. 18) There are also restrictions
on using generalizations based on proxies of protected identities,
such as an address. For example, it is prohibited to deny a loan
request because data analytics has found that people who live in
the same zip code are generally not creditworthy (p. 16).
If one thinks that using these attributes is wrong, even if they
yield accurate predictions, it is because some other value is more
important than accuracy. For example, Bolinger (2018) argues that
accepting generalizations based on racial stereotypes is morally
and epistemically wrong even if the stereotypes are statistically
accurate [65]. She gives the following example to illustrate this
claim (originally from Gendler (2011)): John Hope Franklin is host-
ing an event to celebrate being awarded the Presidential Medal of
Freedom. All other black men on the premises are uniformed atten-
dants. Mistaking Franklin for an attendant, a woman hands him her
coat check ticket and demands he brings her the coat. Statistically,
since all other black men in the party are attendants, the woman’s
prediction that Franklin is an attendant is accurate. However, the as-
sumption that Franklin is an attendant still feels wrong. Bolinger’s
explanation is that the problem is that the prediction is based on
a racial stereotype (that black people have a lower social status),
which is wrong even if the stereotype is statistically accurate. On
Bolinger’s view, relying on racial stereotypes is wrong because of
cumulative effects. If the only time someone assumed Franklin has
a low social status was at that party, the harm would have been
minimal, just a one-off mistake based on a correct generalization.
But when the same type of assumption is made consistently, as it
is in the case of racial stereotypes, it interferes with black people’s
ability to signal authority and high social status. This results in
limiting their opportunities for advancement which is incompatible
with respecting their moral equality and autonomy.
Bolinger’s explanation is of course only one attempt explain
what it wrong with relying on generalizations based on social iden-
tity. Whatever the details are, the general point is that accuracy
is not necessarily a value-neutral evaluation criterion. One reason
is that decisions on which considerations are permissible to use
in attempting to make accurate predictions are value-laden. For
example, when predictions are accurate because they rely on racial
generalizations, accuracy is a carrier of social values. The accuracy
of algorithms that intentionally avoid relying on racial generaliza-
tions is also value-laden: in those cases accuracy is a carrier of the
value of equality. Moreover, even putting aside the fact that accu-
racy is not value neutral, prioritizing accuracy over other virtues is
not neutral because the other virtues are not.
What these examples illustrate is that high accuracy is not the
only thing that matters – how amodel achieves high accuracy is also
important. Therefore, interpertability, the ability to articulate why
a model made a certain prediction, is in competition with accuracy.
Deep learning models are often described as “black-boxes” because
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how they achieve high accuracy is difficult to scrutinize. Other
model-types, such as graphical models, decision trees, or support
vector machines, are typically easier to scrutinize to understand
how a decision was made. There are multiple ways to address the
tension between accuracy and interpretability. A person who prior-
itizes accuracy may be more inclined to try to make deep learning
algorithms more amenable to scrutiny [67–69]. On the other hand,
if interpretabililty is essential, then it may be more appealing to sim-
ply use a model that is already more amenable to interpretability.9
What we see here is that disagreements on which approach to take
and which model-type to use also encode prioritizations on values.
In this case, between accuracy and interpretability. Thus, the rise
and fall of a model-type may encode the rise and fall of some values.
In particular, increased interest in values like fairness, explainabil-
ity, and interpretability may motivate favoring model-types other
than deep learning.
5 CONCLUSION, AND VALUES IN
DELIBERATION
There is a simple story to be told about disciplinary shifts inmachine
learning – that progress is made by better models. But as we have
seen, what is “better” cannot be a purely objective choice. First,
because the rise of model-types comes hand in hand with rise
of corresponding ways to evaluate model-types. Second, because
comparisons between model types are value-laden, encoding social,
political, and environmental values.
It is important to explicitly reveal values that are shaping the
discipline, so that these values can be examined and changed when
deemed undesirable. Some in the community have already begun
pushing for reforms of such disciplinary values. For example, the
Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence’s recent “Green AI” paper
[60] advocates for increasing effort in “environmentally friendly and
inclusive” AI research. They suggest to introduce environmentally
positive incentives in the research community by creating norms
around reporting measures of efficiency, e.g. accuracy as a function
of computational cost, rather than simply accuracy alone.
A related question inspired by these issues is who should make
decisions in what values are furthered? Who gets to have a voice?
In talking about selection of problems in science, Kitcher (2011)
argues that all sides should have a say, including laypersons [71].
A question for machine learning is: is the same true for machine
learning? Who should have a say about which criteria are impor-
tant in evaluating model-types? That is itself another value-laden
question.
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